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MIRANDA OR ITS EQUIVALENT: THE TWO “W’S” OF 
REASONABLE CONVEYANCE 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Dunbar1 
(decided on October 28, 2014) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Miranda v. Arizona2 the United States Supreme Court re-
quired that certain warnings must be conveyed to the individual being 
questioned during a custodial interrogation.3  An adequate warning 
must inform the individual: (1) of “the right to remain silent”; (2) 
“that anything said can be used against the individual in court”; (3) of 
the right to have counsel present during questioning prior to trial; and 
(4) if one cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed.4  Only af-
ter this warning “or its equivalent” has been given may statements 
made during questioning be introduced at trial.5  The ambiguity in the 
phrase “or its equivalent” is where interpretation issues arise.6 
 
1 23 N.E.3d 946 (N.Y. 2014). 
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 Id. at 478-79. See id. at 444 (“By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way.”); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 
(1977) (“Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a 
person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ ”); and Rhode Island v. Innis 446 U.S. 291, 
301 (1980) (The Court extended custodial interrogation to include “any words or actions on 
the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”). 
See also J.F. Ghent, What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” Within Rule of Miranda v. 
Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before 
Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). 
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-74. 
5 Id. at 478-79. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 297. 
6 Right to Remain Silent Not Understood by Many Suspects, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/remain-
1
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In 2007, the Queens County District Attorney implemented a 
pre-arraignment interview procedure.7  Pursuant to the procedure an 
assistant district attorney and a detective investigator would conduct 
an interview with a suspect, which occurred before a suspect was ar-
raigned.8  The detective investigator would begin the interview with a 
“scripted preamble” to the Miranda warnings.9  The preamble includ-
ed the following statements: 
If you have an alibi, give me as much information as 
you can, including the names of any people you were 
with; If your version of what happened is different 
from what we’ve been told, this is your opportunity to 
tell us your story; If there is something you need us to 
investigate about this case you have to tell us now so 
we can look into it; This will be your only opportunity 
to speak with us before you go to court on these 
charges.10 
The defendants in People v. Dunbar,11 Jermaine Dunbar and 
Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas (the “defendants”), were both questioned us-
ing this method.12  The New York Court of Appeals held that the pre-
amble undermined the protection required by Miranda, and therefore 
the defendants’ statements during the interview were inadmissible.13  
The court found that the confusing and contradictory nature of the 
preamble negated the effect of the Miranda warnings that followed.14 
This case note will begin with a discussion of Dunbar fol-
 
silent.aspx (“More than 800 different versions of Miranda warnings are used by police agen-
cies across the United States, and vary in reading level from second grade to post-college 
level.”). 
7 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 947. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 947-48. 
10 Id. at 948. 
11 Id. at 946. 
12 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 947-50. 
13 Id. at 953. 
14 Id. See also People v. Perez, 946 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2012).  Dunbar 
was not the first case to challenge the Preamble-Miranda Warning Procedure. Id.  During the 
suppression hearing initiated by the defendant in Perez, the court found that the preamble 
violated the New York Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c). Id. at 842-45.  Rule 8.4(c) pro-
vides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation.” NEW YORK STATE RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2013), http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/jointappellate/NY-Rules-Prof-
Conduct-1200.pdf.  The preamble’s statement to investigate followed by the People’s failure 
to do so is a direct violation of that rule. Perez, 946 N.Y.S at 842-45. 
2
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lowed by an analysis of the purpose and rationale behind the Miranda 
decision.  This note then will argue that an acceptable warning may  
state the warning in Miranda or its equivalent, thus establishing the 
principle of “reasonable conveyance.”  In the next section, the note 
will examine how New York courts have applied Miranda and what 
constitutes acceptable deviations from the exact formulation stated by 
the Supreme Court in the Miranda opinion.  The note will demon-
strate that the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Dunbar is 
consistent with Miranda and the subsequent federal and New York 
State case law. 
II. THE ROAD TO THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 
A. Jermaine Dunbar 
Jermaine Dunbar was taken into custody on April 23, 2009, 
after he was identified as a suspect in connection with an armed rob-
bery.15  Before arraignment, an assistant district attorney and a detec-
tive investigator interviewed Dunbar.16  The assistant district attorney 
and the detective investigator delivered the scripted preamble, the 
Miranda rights, and then informed Dunbar that the interview was be-
ing taped.17  Dunbar demonstrated an understanding of his rights and 
participated in the questioning.18  The information gathered from the 
interview led to his being charged with second-degree attempted rob-
bery and other crimes.19  The People sought to introduce Dunbar’s 
statements at his trial.20  Dunbar made a motion to suppress his 
statements arguing that the “scripted preamble” to the interview vio-
lated his constitutional right against self-incrimination.21  However, 
the prosecution claimed that the statements were a result of a valid 
Miranda warning and waiver.22 
After a review of the totality of the circumstances, the Sup-
 
15 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 948. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 948-49. 
19 Id. at 949. 
20 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 949. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
3
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pression Court denied Dunbar’s motion.23  The court concluded that 
the statements were made after an adequate Miranda warning and a 
voluntary waiver.24  Therefore, Dunbar’s statements were admissible 
at trial.25  The jury convicted Dunbar and the Queens County Su-
preme Court sentenced Dunbar to prison for a term of seventeen 
years to life.26 
B. Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas 
Collin F. Lloyd-Douglas was taken into custody on June 12, 
2008 due to a violent altercation that took place in 2005 between 
Lloyd-Douglas and a woman he was romantically involved with.27  
Similar to Dunbar, an assistant district attorney and a detective inves-
tigator interviewed Lloyd-Douglas before arraignment.28  Following 
the recitation of the preamble and Miranda warnings, he was in-
formed that the interview was being taped.29  Lloyd-Douglas was 
charged with numerous crimes including attempted murder in the 
second degree, first-degree assault, and first-degree robbery.30  The 
People sought to introduce the incriminating statements made at tri-
al.31  Lloyd-Douglas alleged that his statements were not voluntarily 
made because he had been held at booking for twenty-two hours and 
had not been asked if he needed to use the facilities or if he wanted 
any water or food.32  Lloyd-Douglas’ suppression motion had a simi-
lar result to that of Dunbar’s.33  The Judicial Hearing Officer deter-
mined that his statements “were made pursuant to his knowing, intel-
ligent, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights.”34  
Subsequently, the jury convicted Lloyd-Douglas and the Queens 
County Supreme Court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison.35 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 949. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 949-50. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 950. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 950. 
33 Id. at 950-51. 
34 Id. at 951. 
35 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951. 
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C. The Appellate Decision 
On appeal, the Appellate Division for the Second Department 
reversed the trial court’s decisions in both Dunbar’s and Lloyd-
Douglas’s cases.36  The Appellate Court found that the addition of the 
preamble “prevent[ed the Miranda warnings] from effectively con-
veying to the suspects their rights . . . , convey[ing] a ‘muddled and 
ambiguous’ message.”37  The court held that the preamble effected a 
negation of the rights granted by the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, due to its confusing and misleading nature.38  The 
Appellate Court ordered a new trial.39 
III. THE DUNBAR DECISION 
The New York Court of Appeals consolidated both Dunbar’s 
and Lloyd-Douglas’s cases for the purposes of the appeal.40  On re-
view, the court concluded that the preamble “effectively vitiated or at 
least neutralized the effect of the subsequent-delivered Miranda 
warnings.”41 
The court began its analysis by citing Miranda v. Arizona,42 
which established that a person, prior to an interrogation by law en-
forcement, “must be adequately and effectively apprised of his 
rights” provided by the Fifth Amendment.43  The Fifth Amendment 
protects individuals against self-incrimination and is applicable to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.44  The Miranda warnings are an “absolute prerequisite to inter-
 
36 Id. 
37 See People v. Dunbar, 958 N.Y.S.2d 764, 772 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013); see also Peo-
ple v. Lloyd-Douglas, 958 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013) (holding that 
“[b]ecause this procedure was not effective to secure the defendant's fundamental constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel, the defendant's videotaped 
statement should have been suppressed.”). 
38 Dunbar, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 772; Lloyd-Douglas, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 746. 
39 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 953. See id. at 948 (demonstrating the rejection of the preamble by the number of 
times the opinion states the court’s holding: “the preamble undermined the subsequently-
communicated Miranda warnings to the extent that Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglas were not 
‘adequately and effectively’ advised of the choice [the Fifth Amendment] guarantees’ 
against self-incrimination before they agreed to speak with law enforcement authorities.”). 
42 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
43 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951. 
44 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a 
5
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rogation.”45 
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argu-
ment that Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglas’s statements were admissible 
following the preamble and the Miranda warning, reasoning that 
simply stating the warnings is not enough in every situation.46  If the 
warning fails to “convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miran-
da” it will not be found sufficient.47  The court found the preamble  
contradicted the subsequent Miranda warnings that were given and it 
created an atmosphere where keeping silent would be detrimental to 
one’s case.48  Specifically, the fact that “remaining silent or invoking 
the right to counsel would come at a price––they would be giving up 
a valuable opportunity to speak with an assistant district attorney, to 
have their cases investigated or to assert alibi defenses.”49  Accord-
ingly, the preamble coupled with the Miranda warning failed to con-
vey the necessary rights.50 
IV. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
An explanation of the federal case law protecting compelled 
self-incrimination is necessary in order to demonstrate why the pre-
amble undermines a constitutionally protected right.  The Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides the privilege 
against self-incrimination––specifically, “[n]o person shall be . . . 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”51  
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the historic case Miranda 
v. Arizona,52 extended the protections provided by the Constitution to 
individuals during a custodial interrogation.53 
The United States Supreme Court held that a state agent must 
inform a person of his or her Fifth Amendment privileges prior to any 
 
witness against himself.”). 
45 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 951. 
46 Id. at 952-53; see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (“Cases in which a 
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘com-
pelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miran-
da are rare.”). 
47 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 952-53. 
48 Id. at 953. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
52 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
53 Id. at. 439. 
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custodial questioning.54  The Court concluded that an individual 
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has 
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be 
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right 
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot af-
ford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to 
any questioning if he so desires.55 
The required warnings are necessary safeguards to ensure that any 
statements made are the result of free choice.56  The procedural safe-
guards required in an interrogation include the Miranda warnings “or 
their equivalent.”57 
The rationale behind the Court’s holding in Miranda provides 
a foundation for the decisions that follow and establishes what is con-
sidered an adequate equivalent.58  The Court cited two primary rea-
sons to support the need for “safeguards” throughout its opinion.59  
First, the Court examined the environment and circumstances sur-
rounding a custodial interrogation, such as the psychological effect of 
an interrogation.60  Due to the very nature of the act, police interroga-
tion is at odds with the free will of the accused.61  The person being 
questioned is cut off from the outside world, confined to a room with 
law enforcement personnel, in an unfamiliar setting.62  The Court 
 
54 Id. at 471. 
55 Id. at 479; see id. at 469 (“The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompa-
nied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in 
court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege but also 
of the consequences of foregoing it.”); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 (“The presence of 
an attorney, and the warnings delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under other-
wise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that 
eliminates the evils of the interrogation process.”). 
56 Id. at 457-58. 
57 See Innis, 466 U.S. at 297. 
58 See infra note 60. 
59 Miranda, 384 U.S.at 455. 
60 Id. (noting that the prevention of “psychological harm” is a natural follow up to the pre-
viously decided unlawful nature of the use of “physical harm”).  Id.  The Court found that 
the law enforcement personnel had experience in obtaining confessions. Id. at 448-52.  This 
was evident after an examination of police manuals that provided tips for obtaining a confes-
sion. Id. See also id. at 450 (“These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological 
state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already––that 
he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged.”). 
61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (rejecting the argument “that society’s need for interrogation 
outweighs the privilege”). 
62 Id. at 449-50. 
7
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found that the nature of the interrogation procedure is at times “to 
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.”63  A person 
could easily be manipulated due to the toll of interrogation.64 
The opinion relied on case law concerning compelled confes-
sions and the privilege against self-incrimination.65  Specifically, the 
Court cited Bram v. United States,66 which provided guidance for de-
termining if a confession was truly voluntary.67  The Court concluded 
that when an individual makes “a statement when but for the improp-
er influences he would have remained silent” the words are not vol-
untary.68  The Court found that “establishing merely that the confes-
sion was not induced by promise or threat” does not prove 
voluntariness.69  In order to meet this threshold, the making of com-
munication must be voluntary and any evidence of compulsion will 
render the statements inadmissible.70  The Court concluded that a 
waiver must be explicit and rejected the presumption of a waiver due 
to silence.71 
Second, the Court addressed the scope of the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the applicability of said rights in state court 
proceedings.72  The Court began its discussion of the protection 
against compelled confession with Escobedo v. State of Illinois.73  
The Court held in Escobedo that the defendant was not adequately 
advised of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because 
the emotional state of the defendant had led to a diminished capacity 
for “rational judgment.”74  In Escobedo, law enforcement repeatedly 
denied the defendant’s request for counsel.75  The position the de-
fendant was in created an environment designed to “produce upon his 
mind the fear that, if he remained silent, it would be considered an 
 
63 Id. at 457. Id. at 450 (noting that “the manuals instruct the police to display an air of 
confidence in the suspect’s guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in 
confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited as a fact.”). 
64 Id. 
65 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-62. 
66 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
67 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461. 
68 Id. at 462 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 549). 
69 Id. 
70 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462. See Bram, 168 U.S. 532. 
71 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). 
72 Miranda, 384 U.S.at 458-66. 
73 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440-42, 465-66. 
74 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 385-86. 
75 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 385-86. 
8
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admission of guilt.”76  Therefore, the defendant did not competently 
or knowingly waive his rights because he was not adequately in-
formed of his rights.77 
After an examination of the nature and environment of an in-
terrogation and the history behind Miranda, the Court concluded that 
“only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of [these] 
right[s] can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exer-
cise [them].”78 
V. THE TWO “W’S” OF DEFINING “REASONABLY CONVEY” 
After the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court decided mul-
tiple cases that clarified what is considered to be an adequate “safe-
guard.”  This was in part due to the fact that the Court in Miranda on-
ly dictated the rights that are to be conveyed by the warning––the 
Court did not dictate the actual language to be used.79  States have the 
discretion to script their own warnings; however, issues arise when 
the deviation from the Miranda warnings fails to adequately inform 
the detainee of the protections required by Miranda.80  The safeguard 
issues can be broken up into two categories: (1) the language used, 
and (2) the timing of the warning. 
A. The “What?” of Reasonably Conveyance 
The United States Supreme Court has held that additional 
language or a change in the wording of the warning does not auto-
matically render the warning ineffective or in violation of the holding 
 
76 Id. at 485. 
77 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465-66. See also id. at 465 (“[T]he compelling atmosphere of the 
in-custody interrogation, and not an independent decision on [the defendant’s] part, caused 
the defendant to speak.”); Id. at 466 (“The presence of an attorney, and the warnings deliv-
ered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell 
his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils of the interrogation 
process.”). 
78 Id. at 473. 
79 Id. at 476. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (“This Court has never 
indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings giv-
en a criminal defendant.”); Innis, 466 U.S. at 297 (explaining that the acceptable safeguards 
are “Miranda warnings . . . or their equivalent”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03 
(1989) (“We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described 
in that decision.”). 
80 See supra notes 4-6. 
9
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in Miranda.81  For instance, the Court in California v. Prysock82 pro-
vided clarity on acceptable deviations from the language of Miran-
da.83  The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the detainee 
was adequately advised of the Miranda warning with concern to the 
right to counsel.84  The specific issue was whether “the right to ap-
pointed counsel was linked with some future point in time after po-
lice interrogation,” thus in violation of Miranda.85  Specifically the 
language at issue was “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer before 
you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being 
questioned, and all during the questioning” and “[y]ou all, uh – if, – 
you have the right to have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no 
cost to yourself.”86  After each statement the officer asked the de-
fendant if he understood his rights, and the defendant answered in the 
affirmative.87 
The Court held that the additional language in Prysock did not 
act in contravention of Miranda.88  The Court supported its holding 
by citing to prior cases where lower courts rejected warnings as vio-
lative of Miranda.89  Specifically, a violation did not occur when the 
additional language used, with concern to appointed counsel, “was 
linked to a future point in time after police interrogation.”90  The 
 
81 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490. 
We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any 
specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-
incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are 
free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are 
fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons 
of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to ex-
ercise it. 
Id. 
82 453 U.S. 355 (1981). 
83 Id. at 359-60. 
84 Id. at 360. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 356-57. 
87 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356-57. 
88 Id. at 362. 
89 Id. at 360. 
90 Id. See United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134, 134 (9th Cir. 1970) (rejecting the notion 
that one could “have an attorney appointed to represent you when you first appear before the 
U.S. Commissioner or the Court.”); People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 358-61 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1968).  The court there rejected two different warnings as inadequate. Id.  The first “if 
he was charged . . . he would be appointed counsel” and the second concerned a defendant 
who was being moved to another state and was told that “the court would appoint an attor-
ney” after he was moved.  Id. 
10
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Court found that the additional language in the supportive cases 
failed to inform the suspect of his right to counsel during such inter-
rogation.91  The Court distinguished these warnings from the warn-
ings given to the defendant in Prysock, and found that nothing “sug-
gested any limitation on the right to the presence of appointed 
counsel.”92  Thus, the Court held the warnings given to the defendant 
were consistent with Miranda because he was fully informed of his 
rights.93  The language used did not undermine the warnings granted 
in Miranda, nor did it manipulate the warnings to the advantage of 
the questioner.94 
The issue was re-addressed in Duckworth v. Eagan95 eight 
years later.  The warning in that case included all the requirements of 
Miranda.96  The detainee was told of her right to remain silent and 
her right to an attorney.97  However, the police added the language “if 
and when you go to court” to the warning given with respect to coun-
sel.98  The United States Supreme Court held that the warnings “in 
their totality” were in compliance with Miranda.99  The Court sup-
ported its holding with two rationales.100  First, the language did not 
undermine the Miranda warnings because the additional language 
could be reasonably deemed in anticipation of a common question: 
When does one have an attorney appointed?101  The Court saw the 
statement as advice, which was consistent with Miranda.102  Second, 
the required information, that “he has a right to an attorney before 
and during questioning,” was still conveyed to the detainee.103  The 
free will of the detainee was still intact.104 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Pow-
ell105 further clarified what an acceptable deviation from the exact 
 
91 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360. 
92 Id. at 360-61. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 361-62. 
95 492 U.S. 195 (1989). 
96 Id. at 198-99. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 198. 
99 Id. at 205. 
100 Duckworth, 492 U.S at 204. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 203. 
105 559 U.S. 50 (2010). 
11
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warnings dictated in Miranda.106  The police force had taken the de-
fendant into custody and delivered their equivalent to Miranda warn-
ings before any questioning, stating: 
You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the 
right to remain silent, anything you say can be used 
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a 
lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you 
cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed 
for you without cost and before any questioning. You 
have the right to use any of these rights at any time 
you want during this interview.107 
After the defendant signed a form to confirm that he understood his 
rights, he chose to speak with the officers, which led to a confession 
and subsequent indictment.108  The defendant moved to have the 
statements suppressed claiming the Miranda warnings he was given 
were defective.109  On certiorari, the Court expressed the issue simp-
ly, as “whether the warnings reasonably ‘conve[yed] to [a suspect] 
his rights as required by Miranda.’”110  The Court concluded that the 
warnings given were sufficient because they “did not ‘entirely omi[t]’ 
any information Miranda required them to impart.”111  The warnings 
were deemed to reasonably convey the defendant’s right to have an 
attorney present at any time.112  A consistent feature of the cases in 
this section is the consistency with respect to the standard the equiva-
lent warning must meet; however, the Court’s analysis varies depend-
ing on the specific facts of each case. 
B. The “When?” of Reasonably Convey 
The Court’s analysis of when the warning must be recited re-
lies on whether the timing of the warning hampers the detained indi-
vidual’s ability to truly exercise his or her constitutional rights.113  In 
 
106 Id. at 60-62. 
107 Id. at 53-54. 
108 Id. at 54. 
109 Id. 
110 Powell, 559 U.S. at 60. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361. 
111 Powell, 559 U.S. at 62. 
112 Id. 
113 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
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Missouri v. Seibert,114 the Court addressed the issue concerning the 
adequacy of a Miranda warning given mid-questioning.115  The de-
fendant was taken into custody and was subsequently questioned by a 
police officer for thirty to forty minutes.116  Following the officer’s 
questioning, the defendant signed a waiver after she was informed of 
her Miranda warnings.117  However, prior to the warning, the defend-
ant had already confessed to the crime she was being questioned 
about.118  At trial, the defendant sought to suppress both the state-
ments made pre-Miranda and post-Miranda.119  The trial court admit-
ted the statements made after the warning.120  As a result, Seibert was 
charged and convicted of first-degree murder and various other 
crimes.121  However, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and con-
cluded that “the second statement, clearly the product of the invalid 
first statement, should have been suppressed.”122 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Seibert established that Mi-
randa warnings made after an interrogation begins are unacceptable 
and a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.123  The Miranda opinion clearly demonstrated that 
the warning must be given prior to any questioning to achieve its in-
tended purpose.124  A warning in the middle of questioning does not 
have the same effect as a warning given prior to any questioning.125  
The questioning after the Miranda warning coerced the defendant in-
to answering consistently with her prior statements.126  Further, the 
statements that the defendant made before the Miranda warning 
could in a sense be seen as being held against her because the second 
round of questioning used the information from the pre-Miranda 
questioning to obtain an admissible confession.127 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 604. 
116 Id. at 604-5. 
117 Id. at 605. 
118 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 605. 
119 Id. at 605-06. 
120 Id. at 606. 
121 Id. at 605-07. 
122 Id. 
123 Seibert, 542 at 617. 
124 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. 
125 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612-13. 
126 Id. at 605. 
127 Id. at 613, 616 (The Court noted that the question-warn-question sequence is a “police 
strategy adopted to undermine the Miranda warnings.”). 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF DUNBAR UTILIZING MIRANDA AND ITS 
PROGENY 
Miranda does not create a scripted straitjacket for custodial 
interrogation.128  The cases described above establish the premise that 
the failure to give the exact warning dictated in Miranda will not au-
tomatically render the statements inadmissible and the mere recitation 
of the Miranda warning will not render statements admissible. 
A. The “What?” of Reasonably Convey Applied to the 
Preamble in Dunbar 
First, the language of the preamble given to Dunbar and 
Lloyd-Douglas failed to reasonably convey the necessary rights and 
privileges granted to the defendants.129  The Supreme Court requires 
an inquiry into whether the “equivalent” warning is consistent with 
the warnings required by Miranda to determine whether the language 
is acceptable.130  The Court has defined a warning consistent with Mi-
randa as a warning that “reasonably conveys” the rights granted.131  
The rights must be clearly stated in order to insure a detainee under-
stands them.  The preamble lacks clarity. 
The preamble to the Miranda warnings that the defendants 
were given failed to reasonably convey the privileges that protect 
against self-incrimination because the preamble could be seen as a 
limitation on the right to remain silent.132  The preamble’s contradic-
tory terms dilute the Miranda warnings that follow.133  The preamble 
told the defendants “this is your opportunity to tell us your story,” 
and to “give me as much information as you can.”134  These state-
ments are contradictory to the Miranda warning that followed, which 
informed them that they do have “the right to remain silent.”135 
The preamble also posed a limitation on the right to coun-
 
128 See supra note 78. 
129 See supra note 41. 
130 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 952-53. 
131 Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361 (concluding that a deviation from the order of the warning in 
Miranda does not render the warning inadequate). 
132 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 948. 
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sel.136  The scripted preamble included the statement “this will be 
your only opportunity to speak with us before you go to court on 
these charges.”137  Consequently, the preamble conveys that a right to 
counsel was not available during the pre-arraignment questioning and 
prior to seeing a judge.138 
Further, the introduction before the warning could be seen as 
insinuating that collaboration and cooperation with law enforcement 
would help the defendants’ cases.139  The United States Supreme 
Court has noted in numerous cases that the surrounding circumstanc-
es of a criminal defendant’s interrogation requires a heightened pro-
tection of his or her rights against self-incrimination.140  The fact that 
the defendants were told that a subsequent investigation would be 
conducted if they spoke to the investigators was in direct conflict 
with the requisite warning that “anything they said could and would 
be used against them.”141  The preamble allowed the investigator and 
the district attorney to take advantage of the fear and uncertainty al-
ready present.142  This specific manipulation of the Miranda warning 
requirement is unacceptable and fails to meet the threshold the courts 
require.143 
The dissenting opinion in Dunbar distinguished persuasion 
from trickery.144  The dissent contended that persuasion is an im-
portant tool for law enforcement.145  Further, it argued that the use of 
persuasion does not desecrate the Miranda warnings.146  However, 
this argument is easily rebuttable.147  The preamble’s effect on the 
Miranda warnings goes beyond persuasion.148  A reasonable infer-
ence drawn after an examination of the preamble is that refraining 
from talking could potentially come at a price, while discussion of the 
 
136 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 952-53. 
141 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 954-55 (Smith, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “Miranda does not require law en-
forcement officials to repress, or forbid them to encourage, the tendency of criminals to talk 
too much.”). 
145 Id. 
146 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 954-55. 
147 Id. at 953. 
148 Id. 
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occurrence could be to the detainee’s advantage.149 
B. The “When?” of Reasonably Convey Applied to 
the Preamble in Dunbar 
The recitation of Miranda or an equivalent does not automati-
cally render the detainee’s statements admissible.  In Seibert the mid-
questioning Miranda warning procedure failed to adequately advise 
the defendant of her privileges.150  The procedure’s effect was contra-
ry to the purpose the United States Supreme Court sought to further 
in Miranda, thereby undermining its holding.151  The procedure in 
Dunbar––the preamble followed by the Miranda warnings––is com-
parable to the procedure in Seibert.152  A valid conclusion could be 
that the preamble followed by the contradictory Miranda warnings in 
a way cancel each other.153  Consequently, both are inconsistent with 
the Court’s purpose and intent in Miranda.154 
Furthermore, the preamble in general does not convey the de-
sired purpose of the Miranda warnings.155  The purpose of Miranda is 
to inform the defendant of his or her rights and thereby put the de-
fendant in a position to exercise the right if he or she chooses to do 
so.156  The People allege that the “purpose of the [preamble] was to 
get exculpatory information from the innocent; not exculpatory 
statements or evidence.”157  It is doubtful that this is the legitimate 
reason for the practice and instead the primary purpose is to circum-
vent the Miranda warnings that follow the preamble. 
The Court has suggested that each sentence or thought in the 
warnings has a purpose.158  For example, the phrase “you have the 
right to remain silent” is immediately followed by the phrase “any-
thing you say can be used against you in the court of law.”159  This 
 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 952-53. 
151 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 952-53. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 953. 
155 Id. 
156 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (“Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose 
between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.”). 
157 Dunbar, 958 N.Y.S.2d 777. 
158 Dunbar, 23 N.E. at 953. 
159 Id. at 952-53. 
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format is desired to adequately inform the detainee of a cause and ef-
fect of speaking.160  Thus, the individual being questioned is made 
aware of the right to remain silent and the consequences if he chooses 
to assert or not to assert the right.161  In Dunbar, the preamble imme-
diately followed by the Miranda warning renders the warning similar 
to the defective warning in Seibert, in that the manipulation of when 
the warning is given is being used to obtain a confession.162  Thus, 
the timing of the preamble takes away from the Miranda warnings 
that followed.163 
Therefore, the preamble is a contradiction of the Miranda 
warnings that followed.164  A reasonable conclusion drawn is that the 
two separate phrases negate each other.165  It can be argued that a Mi-
randa warning was not given at all, and without further inquiry, the 
statements made during the interrogation would be inadmissible.166 
VII. “REASONABLE CONVEYANCE” IN NEW YORK 
The New York State Constitution’s provision protecting the 
accused is exactly the same as its United States Constitution’s coun-
terpart, which provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”167  Although New 
York has a history of expanding the protection of constitutionally 
protected rights, the case law has demonstrated a consistent adher-
ence to the federal law established in Miranda and its progeny.168 
A. The “What?” of Reasonable Conveyance in New 
York 
New York State case law is consistent with federal case law 
on the topic of additional language and the effect of the Miranda 
warning.  For instance, in People v. Lewis,169 the court rejected the 
 
160 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 952-53. 
163 Id. at 953. 
164 Id. 
165 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953. 
166 Id. 
167 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
168 See 20 N.Y. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 31. 
169 557 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1990). 
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defendant’s claim that the addition of “[n]ow that I have advised you 
of your rights, are you willing to answer questions” negated the Mi-
randa warning that had preceded.170  The court reasoned that the 
warnings in their totality were acceptable because the “words used 
convey[ed] the requisite information.”171 
Another example of an acceptable addition to the Miranda 
warning comes from People v. Bailey.172  In Bailey, the Appellate Di-
vision for the Second Department held that the defendant’s state-
ments were admissible.173  Prior to the detective informing the de-
fendant of his Miranda rights, she advised him, “[T]ell me in [your] 
own words what took place,” and “[I] want you to tell me what hap-
pened.”174  The court concluded that the detective’s additional state-
ments were not “to evoke an incriminating response from the defend-
ant” and thus did not threaten the purpose of the Miranda warnings 
that followed.175 
The New York State courts have concluded that a ritualistic 
formula is not required.176  The only requirement is that the defendant 
is made aware of the “requisite information.”177 
B. The “When?” of Reasonable Conveyance in New 
York 
The New York State courts have consistently applied a “sin-
gle continuous chain of events” test to determine if the timing of the 
Miranda warning is acceptable.178  This inquiry was established in 
People v. Chapple.179  In Chapple a state police officer noticed the 
defendant walking in the vicinity of where a burglary had recently 
 
170 Id. at 454. 
171 Id. 
172 808 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2005). 
173 Id. at 301. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. See also People v. Boyd, 801 N.Y.S.2d 469 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2005). 
176 See supra section VII. A. 
177 See supra note 166. See also People v. Bartlett, 595 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-91 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 1993) (holding that after the warning required by Miranda the sentence “[i]f you can 
not afford to hire a lawyer, one will be furnished for you if you wish, and you have the right 
to keep silent until you have had a chance to talk with a lawyer” the suspect was reasonably 
conveyed his rights.). 
178 341 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1975). 
179 Id. 
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occurred.180  The officer pulled up alongside the defendant in his au-
tomobile.181 The officer then informed the defendant that he wanted 
to talk to him and told the defendant to get in the car.182  Subsequent-
ly, the officer began questioning the defendant as he drove him to the 
site of the burglary, culminating in a confession.183  Thereafter, the 
officer gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and resumed ques-
tioning him.184 
The defendant sought to suppress his post-Miranda state-
ments and ultimate confession in the Clinton County Supreme 
Court.185  The court stated that the appropriate inquiry is whether 
“there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that 
the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of 
one who is not under the influence of questioning.”186  Accordingly, 
the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress because he “was 
subjected to such a continuous interrogation that the Miranda warn-
ings administered at the site of the burglary were insufficient to pro-
tect his rights.”187 
Likewise the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Paul-
man188 applied the Chapple analysis and concluded that the defend-
ant’s statements were admissible due to the lack of “a continuous 
chain of events” between the non-Mirandized and Mirandized ques-
tioning.189  The defendant moved to suppress four incriminating 
statements he had made to law enforcement even though half of the 
statements were made after a Miranda warning.190  The defendant al-
leged that the earlier questioning tainted the statements following the 
Miranda warning.191  The court found a break in the chain of ques-
tioning due to “a change in the police personnel involved in the suc-
cessive interrogatories, which took place in a different location, and 
there were significant differences in the methods eliciting infor-
 
180 Id. at 244. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 244. 
184 Id. at 244-45. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 245-46. 
187 Id. at 246. 
188 833 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 2005). 
189 Id. at 244-47. 
190 Id. at 242. 
191 Id. 
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mation.”192  Accordingly, the statements the defendant made after the 
Miranda warning were admitted.193  The New York courts have con-
sistently approached motions to suppress statements based on a tim-
ing issue in like manner.194 
VIII. A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL AND NEW YORK 
APPROACHES 
The federal and New York State courts have approached the 
“reasonable conveyance” threshold in an unusually consistent way.  
A common feature of the New York case law is to go beyond the 
scope of the federal courts when analyzing a constitutional provi-
sion.195  The phenomenon is not present with respect to the imple-
mentation of the Miranda holding to New York State cases. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
A Miranda warning is a required safeguard.  That being said, 
the law does not support an inference or an expectation of knowledge 
as a responsibility of the suspect during a custodial interrogation.196  
As a result, officers delivering the warnings are required to do so in a 
clear and concise way.197  The preamble and the Miranda warning in 
People v. Dunbar failed to properly deliver the privileges afforded to 
a detainee due to its muddled and contradictory language.198  Conse-
quently, with the preamble procedure in place, the pre-arraignment 
 
192 Id. at 245. 
193 Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 247. 
194 See People v. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937, 939 (N.Y. 1986) (per curiam) (reaffirming the 
rule established in Chapple and as a result suppressing statements made by the defendant 
prior and following the Miranda warning.  The court supported this conclusion because of 
“the close sequence between the unwarned custodial statements in the van and its repetition 
soon after defendant arrived at the precinct.”). See also People v. Malaussena, 891 N.E.2d 
725 (N.Y. 2008) (holding that the defendant’s confession is admissible.  The statements 
made before the Miranda warning and after the Miranda warning were not part of a “single 
continuous chain of events” due to a four-hour gap between the questioning.). 
195 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] state is free as a matter of its own 
law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those the Court holds to be neces-
sary upon federal constitutional standards.”). See also People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 
(N.Y. 1992) (Fourth Amendment); and O’Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc., 523 N.E.2d 
277 (N.Y. 1988) (First Amendment). 
196 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72 (“No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person 
may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead.”). 
197 Id. at 465-71. 
198 Dunbar, 23 N.E.3d at 953. 
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interrogation will most likely never be admissible.  Furthermore, 
even if the procedure is found to be consistent with Miranda, a waiv-
er of the privileges provided will likely never be accepted.199  It is in 
the best interest of both the detainee and the state to remove the 
scripted preamble procedure. 
On February 4, 2015, the People of New York petitioned for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.200  The public interest 
in criminal procedure, specifically the Miranda rights, arguably could 
have  persuaded the Court to hear the case.201  However, on May 4, 
2015 the Court denied the People’s petition for certiorari.202  In the 
event that the Supreme Court did hear the case, it is likely that the 
Court would have held that the procedure is unconstitutional and un-
dermines the warnings required by Miranda.  Holding otherwise 
would contradict all that Miranda seeks to protect. 
 
Amanda Miller* 
 
 
199 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (“Any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, 
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